India’s recent declaration to suspend the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) of 1960, citing Pakistan’s alleged support for cross-border terrorism, marks a serious development in South Asian geopolitics. This historic agreement was brokered by the World Bank, had stood firm despite all the wars and crises. It has been six decades, water cooperation remained one of the few stable elements in India-Pakistan relations. That fragile predictability now hangs in the balance.
What the Treaty guaranteed
The Indus Waters Treaty divided the six rivers of the Indus Basin:
• Eastern Rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej) – Allocated to India
• Western Rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) – Allocated to Pakistan
Pakistan highly depends on these western rivers for nearly 80% of its freshwater supply. While India could use them for limited irrigation and hydropower, it was barred from storing or diverting flows that could harm downstream usage.
Additionally, the treaty set up a Permanent Indus Commission and dispute resolution mechanisms, including neutral experts and international arbitration, to resolve disagreements without escalating into conflict.
Why This Matters Now
The decision of India doesn’t mean an instant water cutoff — physically, it cannot able to stop flows from massive rivers like the Indus or Jhelum, particularly during high-flow seasons (May–September). The infrastructure it has, such as Baglihar and Kishanganga dams, are run-of-the-river projects, incapable of large-scale storage.
However, the real concern lies in the dry season (October–March), when water levels are lower and timing becomes critical. India’s move creates:
• Uncertainty for Pakistan’s agriculture (sowing cycles, irrigation planning)
• Risk to hydropower generation at Tarbela, Mangla, and others
• Strain on inter-provincial water sharing, especially between Punjab and Sindh
• Further stress on the Indus Delta, which already suffers from reduced freshwater outflows
Read more: Pakistan hits back at India: Trade stopped, banned from using airspace, war warning given
Strategic and Environmental Risks
India faces reputational risks too. As a downstream country on the Brahmaputra, India itself depends on China’s restraint. Suspending IWT sets a precedent that could backfire in future diplomatic negotiations with its other neighbors.
• Dam construction in Indian-occupied Kashmir is geologically difficult, expensive, and politically risky
• Diverting water out of the Indus Basin is technically possible, but economically and environmentally unsound
A New Era of Uncertainty
Pakistan doesn’t just depend on the water — it depends on its predictable delivery. Minor disruptions in timing could disrupt wheat and rice cycles, shrink yields, and push costs up. In a water-scarce country already teetering on the edge, the erosion of predictability could have cascading consequences across food, energy, and political stability.
The Bigger Picture
This suspension is not just a legal breach; it’s a signal that even the most durable international cooperation frameworks can unravel. Whether this is a negotiating tactic or the beginning of a long-term shift, it throws a critical shared resource into geopolitical limbo.
What Pakistan Must Do
• Strengthen internal water management and reduce reliance on predictable flows
• Prepare for climate-resilient agriculture and alternative irrigation solutions
• Engage diplomatically to restore treaty mechanisms or negotiate protections
• Monitor upstream activity via satellite and international forums
Conclusion: Water Cannot Be a Weapon
The Indus Basin has nourished civilizations for millennia. Today, it tests the political maturity of two nuclear-armed neighbors. The costs of weaponizing water are simply too high for agriculture, for energy, and for peace.
Pakistan must navigate these uncertain waters with caution, resilience, and proactive diplomacy, because there is no alternative to the rivers that flow through its heartland.